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Summary: This chapter makes the case for strong longtermism: the claim 
that, in many situations, impact on the long-run future is the most 
important feature of our actions. Our case begins with the observation 
that an astronomical number of people could exist in the aeons to come. 
Even on conservative estimates, the expected future population is 
enormous. We then add a moral claim: all the consequences of our 
actions matter. In particular, the moral importance of what happens 
does not depend on when it happens. That pushes us toward strong 
longtermism. 
 
We then address a few potential concerns, the first of which is that it is 
impossible to have any sufficiently predictable influence on the course 
of the long-run future. We argue that this is not true. Some actions can 
reasonably be expected to improve humanity’s long-term prospects. 
These include reducing the risk of human extinction, preventing 
climate change, guiding the development of artificial intelligence, and 
investing funds for later use. We end by arguing that these actions are 
more than just extremely effective ways to do good. Since the benefits 
of longtermist efforts are large and the personal costs are comparatively 
small, we are morally required to take up these efforts. 
 
Introduction 
The future is big. Our planet currently hosts around eight billion people. This 
century will see the birth of more than ten billion. If that number holds steady for 
just ten more centuries, we have a hundred billion people ahead of us. But 
humanity could last much longer than that. If all goes well, we can expect our 
descendants to outnumber us by an even greater margin. We residents of the 
twenty-first century could turn out to be a drop in the ocean. 
It is hard to grasp the size of humanity’s potential. We are not used to thinking 
on the necessary timescales. Harold Wilson said that a week was a long time in 
politics, and the remark seems true of many other domains too.1 Our world 
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changes so quickly that the consequences of our actions even a few years from now 
are tough to predict,2 so it is no surprise that we rarely consider how our decisions 
might affect people living hundreds, thousands, or even millions of years in the 
future. 
Nonetheless, we — the authors — believe that this neglect of the long-term 
future is a grave moral error. The view recently dubbed longtermism serves as a 
corrective.3 According to this view, we should be particularly concerned with 
ensuring that the long-term future goes well. In this contribution, we argue for 
both longtermism and a further claim that we call strong longtermism which states 
that, in many situations, impact on the long-term future is the most important 
feature of our actions today. 
Where exactly the short-term future ends and the long-term future begins is 
not important. We claim that the view is true even when we draw the line a 
surprisingly long time from now — say, a hundred years. The claim, then, is that 
the moral value of our actions depends primarily on their consequences arising 
more than a century in the future. That means that the predicted short-run value 
of our actions should not weigh heavily in our decision-making. Instead, our 
choices should be driven mainly by long-run considerations. Short-term effects 
matter, but they matter primarily as mediators of long-term effects. 
We believe that strong longtermism has practical implications for individuals, 
charities, and governments. Humanity’s future could be extraordinarily valuable, 
and it currently hangs in the balance. If these facts were widely recognised, many 
of our priorities would change. 
The case for strong longtermism 
The case for strong longtermism begins with the observation that our future could 
be vast. Astronomical numbers of people could exist in the aeons to come. Of 
course, the exact number is uncertain. The range of possibilities is wide. But, for 
our purposes, we can work with the expected number of future people. We calculate 
this figure in the same way that we calculate the expected value of a lottery ticket. 
Suppose that a ticket offers a 1% chance of winning £300. Then its expected value 
is 0.01 × £300 = £3. 
Whether a lottery ticket is worth buying depends on the numbers, and the 
same is true of our argument for longtermism. Here, as below, we will endeavour 
to be conservative in our estimates, erring on the side of underestimating the 
expected number of future people. If the case for longtermism is strong on these 
numbers, it will be even stronger on less cautious estimates. In that spirit, suppose 
that the chance that humanity survives until the Earth becomes uninhabitable — 
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one billion years from now4 — is just 0.1%. The future is hard to predict, so being 
more than 99.9% confident that we will not make it that far seems hubristic. 
Suppose also that ten billion people live in each century. In that case, the expected 
number of future people is at least 100 trillion (1014) — over 10,000 times the 
number of people alive today. 
The size of that number might lead you to think that our estimates were not 
conservative after all. But note that the above calculation leaves out many 
opportunities for further inflation. Perhaps the most significant is the chance of 
space settlement. There are around 250 billion stars in the Milky Way, some of 
which will last for trillions of years.5 If we judge that there is even a tiny chance 
that our descendants settle just a small fraction of these solar systems, the expected 
number of future people balloons upward. 
Suffice it to say, the expected future population is large indeed. That is the 
first component of our argument for strong longtermism. The second component 
is a moral claim: all the consequences of our actions matter. More specifically, the 
moral importance of what happens does not depend on when it happens. Agony and 
ecstasy occurring a hundred years from now matter just as much as agony and 
ecstasy occurring ten years from now. 
This claim rules out what economists call a ‘positive rate of pure time 
preference’: preferring that good things occur at earlier rather than later times 
purely because they are earlier. To be sure, time preferences are appropriate in 
some domains. A pound now is preferable to a pound in ten years’ time. But that 
is because we expect to be richer in the future, and pounds have diminishing 
marginal utility. Features of our lives that are intrinsically good or bad — things 
like joy and sadness — do not have diminishing marginal utility, so time 
preferences concerning these things are out of place. Consider an example. 
Suppose that you can save one person from torture ten years from now or two 
people from torture a hundred years from now, and that your decision will have 
no other consequences. It seems clear that, in this case, you should save the two 
people. Their pain should not be discounted simply because it occurs further in the 
future.6 
Together, our argument’s two components — the future is vast and all 
consequences matter — push us toward our conclusion: we can have a much bigger 
effect on the value of the future by trying to change its long-term rather than its 
short-term value. That in turn suggests that we should devote much more of our 
focus to considering the long-run effects of our decisions, and makes plausible the 
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strong longtermist claim that, in many situations, we ought to perform the action 
that we expect will have the best effects on the long-term future. 
This claim is only strengthened by the observation that, so far, few people 
have recognised the importance of this longtermist insight. Most people and 
institutions are biased towards the short term.7 If we direct our focus on the next 
few years, we enter a crowded field in which many of the best opportunities have 
already been taken and further progress is difficult. But if we instead cast our sights 
further, we find fresh ground. Any opportunities here are less likely to have been 
taken, so we can expect to have an outsized impact. 
Longtermist initiatives 
But can we predictably improve the long-run future? One might think not, 
reasoning along the following lines: 
Our world is so complex that it is impossible to foresee what 
effects our actions will have decades from now, let alone 
centuries. Since the long-run consequences of our actions are so 
uncertain, we cannot reasonably expect that any of our actions 
will make the long-term future better rather than worse. In light 
of this uncertainty, we should focus on the near future where 
effects are easier to predict. 
We agree that the long-run value of many actions is hard to predict. But, 
importantly, this is not true of all actions. Some actions can be reasonably expected 
to improve humanity’s long-term prospects, and this is enough to make strong 
longtermism true. 
To explain one set of such actions, we first need to introduce an idea. Imagine 
a golf ball blown around a putting green by blustering winds. While the ball is on 
the turf, it will roll back and forth. The state of the scene will be constantly 
changing. But if the ball falls into a hole, it will remain there. The ball’s being in 
the hole is what we call a persistent state. It is a state which, upon coming about, 
tends to persist for a long time. 
Our world is like this windy putting green. It too has persistent states. Human 
extinction is one of them. The chances of humanity evolving all over again, post-
extinction, are tiny. Human survival is another persistent state, albeit to a lesser 
extent. While the risks of extinction are real, there is at least a strong tendency for 
humanity to endure. These two persistent states differ in their long-run value. Our 
survival through the next thousand years and beyond is, plausibly, better than our 
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extinction in the near future. So, if we can reduce the chance of human extinction, 
we can predictably improve the long-term future.8 
And it is increasingly recognised that we can reduce the chance of extinction. 
Matheny (2007), for instance, estimates that a $20 billion asteroid deflection 
system could halve the probability of an extinction-level asteroid hitting the Earth 
this century, reducing the risk from one-in-one-million to one-in-two-million. 
That decrease may seem small in absolute terms, but it makes an enormous 
difference to the expected number of future people. Recall that our calculation 
from the previous section gave us an expected future population of 100 trillion. 
Increasing the chance that this population gets to exist by just one-in-two-million 
is equivalent to saving 50 million lives in expectation. That comes out at $400 per 
life saved. And this is just one example. Combatting other extinction threats — 
such as those arising from new or engineered pandemics — might be even more 
cost-effective.9 This we could achieve by funding biosecurity work at the Johns 
Hopkins Center for Health Security,10 for instance, or the Future of Humanity 
Institute.11 
That said, the case for reducing extinction risk hangs on our moral view. If 
we embrace a person-affecting approach to future generations — on which we care 
about making lives good but not about making good lives12 — then extinction would 
not be so bad. It might even be judged good.13 An asymmetric moral view — 
according to which bad lives get more weight than good lives — might lead us to 
a similar verdict.14 And even on more standard views about the value of bringing 
new generations into existence, we might worry that future lives will be bad 
overall, so that extinction would be the lesser evil.15 
Nevertheless, we argue, those drawn to person-affecting, asymmetric, and 
pessimistic views should still be strong longtermists. That is because extinction is 
not the only persistent state whose likelihood we can affect. Artificial intelligence 
presents another opportunity. Experts judge that there is a real chance that we 
develop advanced AI this century, with capabilities exceeding our own across a 
wide range of domains.16 As a result of their superior intelligence, these artificial 
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agents may come to exert significant control over human affairs: making important 
decisions on behalf of individuals, governments, and other institutions. These 
agents might also endure indefinitely. Since their underlying code could be copied, 
they could outlast any given piece of hardware.17 These two features of AI systems 
— their influence and their staying power — mean that they are likely to have 
substantial and lasting effects on the future.18 That in turn suggests that we can have 
a beneficial influence on the long-term by increasing the chances that these systems 
are aligned with the right values. Work underway at OpenAI19 and the Center for 
Security and Emerging Technology20 — to take just two examples — aims to 
achieve exactly that. 
Another set of persistent states relates to climate change. A warmer climate 
could slow long-run economic growth, leaving future civilisation worse-off 
indefinitely.21 It could also lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of coral 
reefs, and other forms of irreversible damage to our ecosystem.22 Because these 
potential harms are near-permanent, we can expect that fighting climate change 
will have enduring effects on the future. 
In sum, humanity finds itself in a delicate position. Our civilisation is 
currently poised between a range of persistent states. Falling into one of these states 
would likely have immense effects on the long-term future. Through the judicious 
use of time and resources, we can alter the chances that these states come about. 
As a consequence, we have the power to make our world better for generations to 
come. 
But, as noted above, the case for strong longtermism hinges on the numbers. 
Not every lottery ticket is worth buying, and the same could be true of our 
proposed longtermist interventions. However, we argue that — even on 
conservative figures — the opportunities we list above are well worth the expense. 
Matheny’s proposed asteroid deflection system is one example. Another concerns 
artificial intelligence. If £1 billion of grants could reduce the chance of a 
catastrophic AI outcome — in which humanity’s future is rendered near-worthless 
— by just 0.001%, then a £10,000 donation can do as much good as saving 10,000 
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lives.23 By contrast, it is widely agreed that the best available human-centric short-
term interventions save roughly 4 lives per £10,000, at least in the short term.24  
And there is still much we do not know. Even if, at present, we cannot 
reasonably expect any of these longtermist initiatives to have better consequences 
than the most effective short-term actions, it remains possible that extra 
information would tip the scales in favour of a longtermist option. In that case, 
funding research into the long-run effects of various initiatives may be our best 
move. Since future people would likely take note of this research, we can expect 
our donations to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian efforts for many years 
to come. 
Another option is to save our money.25 We could set up a foundation or 
donor-advised fund with an explicitly longtermist mission. This fund would pay 
out if and when a good opportunity to shape the long-term future arises. The phase 
before the widespread deployment of advanced artificial intelligence would be one 
such opportunity. Since both the value of this longtermist fund and our knowledge 
about the efficacy of various actions is likely to grow over time, we can expect its 
impact to be especially substantial. 
The upshot is that we have a whole array of opportunities to benefit the 
generations who could exist in centuries to come. Even on the most cautious 
estimates, we should expect longtermist initiatives to do many times as much good 
as it is possible to do in the short term. So, if our aim is to do good, we should 
focus on the long term. 
Are we morally required to be longtermists? 
The argument above will motivate many people to set their sights on the long term. 
But others might want to hear more about the precise moral status of longtermist 
initiatives. For even if longtermist actions like reducing extinction risk have the best 
effects on the future, that does not immediately imply that we are morally required to 
reduce extinction risk. For those people motivated mainly by a desire to avoid 
acting immorally, and not by a more wide-ranging desire to do good, this last step 
is important. 
Let us expand on this point. On some moral views, doing what has the best 
effects is not always morally required.26 Consider an example. Suppose that you 
are walking by a shallow pond, and a child asks you to wade in and get her football. 
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You judge that the joy the child would feel in getting her ball back outweighs the 
frustration you would feel in ruining your clothes, so wading in would have the 
best consequences. Nevertheless, one might well claim, you are not morally 
required to wade in. You need not feel bad about staying dry. Similarly, one might 
argue, we are not morally required to do what has the best effects on the long-run 
future. We can instead devote our time and resources to other things. 
Perhaps there are cases where we need not do what is impartially best.27 We 
can allow that. But even so, we maintain that longtermist actions are morally 
required. This conclusion is implied by the following plausible claim: 
When the action with the best effects has effects much better than 
other available actions, and any difference in personal costs is 
comparatively small, we are morally required to perform the 
action with the best effects.28 
This claim is compatible with the judgement that you need not wade into the pond. 
Although wading in would have better effects than staying dry, the effects are 
presumably not much better. The claim also makes sense of our judgements in an 
amended version of the case. Suppose instead that the child is drowning in the 
shallow pond. Then it seems undeniable that you are morally required to wade in 
and save her. Precisely because the stakes are high and the cost to you is small, you 
must do what is best.29 
Our situation is closer to the drowning case than it is to the football case. 
Longtermist initiatives like preventing future pandemics are not merely slightly 
more effective than the best short-term initiatives. They are many times more 
effective.30 Since the consequences of longtermist efforts are so much better in 
expectation, and the personal costs of a long-run focus are small, we are morally 
required to take up longtermist efforts. 
Conclusion 
Humanity’s potential is vast and yet fragile. We could be on the verge of a long and 
magnificent future in which our descendants flourish for aeons to come. We could 
also be headed for an untimely end, or a drop into a permanent rut. Our fate is as 
yet undetermined. Influencing the chances that these futures come to pass is within 
our power. 
These facts, in combination with a couple of plausible moral claims, have led 
us to a surprising conclusion: in many situations, effects on the long-run future are 
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the most important feature of our actions today. This shift to a strong longtermist 
perspective is of no small importance. In fact, it has many practical implications. It 
directs us to spend significantly more of our time and resources on reducing 
extinction risk, preventing climate change, guiding AI development, improving 
institutional decision-making, fostering international cooperation, researching the 
long-run efficacy of various initiatives, investing funds for later use, and — almost 
certainly — many other things besides. 
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